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ABSTRACT
Although the ratio of gross fixed nonresidential investment to GNP
has decreased very little since the late 1960's, the corresponding net
investment ratio declined by nearly 40 percent between the second half
of the l960's and the second half of the 1970's. Four—fifths of this
decline was due to the increased ratio of depreciation to GNP and only
one—fifth to the decreased ratio of gross investment to GNP. The increased
ratio of depreciation to GNP was in turn due in equal amounts to the higher
ratio of capital to GNP and to the higher rate of depreciation. Nearly
half of the higher depreciation rate was due to the increased rate of
depreciation of equipment and nearly half to the increased share of equip-
ment in the capital stock.
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There hasbeenwidespread concern in recent years about the decline in
the rate of investment. Experts like Denison (1979) and Baily (1980) have
pointed to the slow growth of the capital stock as one of the reasons for the
slowdown in productivity growth. But, at the same time, the official Department
ofCommerce figures released in 1980 and 1981 indicate that the ratio offixed
nonresidentialinvestmentto gross national product has shown virtually no trend
since the late 1960's and was actually higher in 1979 (0.110) than it had beenin
1969(o.ioy).Moregenerally, the ratio of fixed nonresidential investment to
GNP was virtually the same in the last half of the 1910's (0.103) as it had been
in the last half of the 1960's (0.106).
The apparent conflict between these two views of investment is easily
reconciled: the ratio of gross investment to GNP has been relatively stable
while net investment has declined significantly. The fall in net nonresidential
investment has been particularly sharp. The relevant figures are compared in
thefirst four columns of Table 1.1 Colunn1 shows the stability of the ratio
ofgross private investment to GNP. This ratio declined by only seven percent
from its average of 0.159 in the second half of the 1960's to 0.i18 in the
secondhalf of the 1970's.The same picture of stability emerges if housing and
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1-Al1of the figures used in this paper are from Department of Commerce
sources. Specificreferences are given in the Appendix. The depreciation
amountsand net investment figures are constant dollar amounts andareintended
to reflect real economic depreciation; see below, page 1. They allreflectthe
upward revision of investment in the data released in late 1980.TABLE 1
THE SHARE OF INVESTMENT IN GNP AND
THEGROWTH OF THE CAPITAL STOCK 1948-1919





















(i) (2)() (14) (5) (6) (fl
19148 0.168 O.1OL0.089O.O' 0.012 0.032 0.063
191490.133 0.0930.050 0.030 0.010 0.020 0.0141
19500.175 0.0930.095 0.032 0.011 0.020 0.0145
1951 0.162 0.091 0.0814 0.031 0.012 0.018 0.0145
19520.138 0.0810.0590.025 0.011 0.0114 0.031
19530.131 0.0900.057 0.028 0.0114 0.0114 0.0141
195140.1350.0900.050 0.0214 0.015 0.009 0.033
19550.1580.0930.0750.029 o.oi6 0.013 o.o14i
1956 0.1530.0970.0690.031 0.019 0.012 0.0)414
1957 0.11420.0910.0560.030 0.018 0.012 0.0141
1958 0.1290.0870.01400.018 0.015 0.003 0.0214
1959 0.1500.0880.06140.021 o.oi)4 0.007 0.029
1960 0.11420.0910.1146 0.0214 o.oi6 0.008 0.032
1961 0.1310.0880.0510.019 o.oi6 0.006 0.029
1962 0.1147 0.0900.0630.025 o.oi6 0.009 0.035
1963 0.1500.0900.0670.026 0.015 0.011 0.036
196)4 0.152 0.09140.0700.031 0.016 0.015 0.01414
1965 0.1630.1050.083 0.0142 0.021 0.021 0.059
1966 o.i660.1100.086 0.0147 0.022 0.025 0.066
1967 0.153 0.10140.071 0.0140 0.019 0.021 0.055
1968 0.1530.1030.0100.039 0.018 0.021 0.052
1969 0.1580.1070.073 0.0141 0.019 0.022 0.05)4
1910 0.11460.1050.0570.035 0.017 0.018 0.01414
1971 0.1550.1000.0660.029 0.015 o.oi)4 0.037
1972 0.1640.1020.0750.031 0.014 0.017 0.0)40
19730.173 0.1100.085 0.0)40 0.015 0.025 0.052
197)4 0.151 0.109 0.06140.035 0.012 0.023 0.0143
1975 0.125 0.0970.028 0.019 0.001 0.012 0.022
19760.1)420.0970.0)460.020 0.007 0.013 0.0214
1977 0.156 0.1030.061 0.026 0.007 0.019 0.033
1978 o.i6o1.1010.0660.031 0.009 0.022 0.040
1979 0.151 0.1100.061 0.033 0.011 0.023 0.0)42—3—
inventories are ignored and attention is limited to gross fixed nonresidential
investment. Column 2 shows that the ratio of gross fixed nonresidential invest-
ment to GNP averaged 0.106 in the peak years of the second half of the 1960's
and then fell by less than three—percent of its value to 0.103 in the second
half of the 1970's.
The decline in net investment was much sharper. The ratio of total
net private investment to GNP (column 3) declined by more than 30 percent (from
0.077 in the late 1960's to 0.052 in the late 1970's) while the ratio of net
fixed nonresidential investment to GNP (column 1) fell nearly 40 percent (from
0.0I2 to less than 0.026). The absolute declines in net investment were larger
than the corresponding absolute declines in gross investment: 0.025 for net
private investment versus 0.011 for gross private investment and 0.016 versis
0.003 for fixed nonresidential investment. Since net investment is generally
less than one—half of gross—investment, the proportional declines are relatively
larger.
The decline in net investment affected both structures and equipment.
The figures in column 5 show that net investment in nonresidential structures
fell from 2.0 percent of GNP in the second half of the 1960's to only 0.8 per-
cent of GNP in the second half of the 1970's. Jiring the same period, net
investment in nonresidential equipment fell from 2.2 percent of GNP to 1.8 per-
cent of GNP.
The sharp fall in net fixed nonresidential investment implied an even
sharper fall in the rate of growth of the net stock of nonresidential fixed
capital. Column 7 shows that this growth rate averaged 5.7 percent in the
second half of the 1960's but only 3.2 percent in the second half of the 1970's.-1 -
Althoughthe final years of the decade showed a slight improvement, the rate was
still down substantially from the values for earlier decades.
Although the comparison of gross andnetinvestment rates eliminates
theapparent inconsistency between the two views of investment behavior, it
raises the new puzzle of why net investment declined so sharply while gross
investment declined so rrnich less. Two factors account for this difference.
First, since net investment is only a fraction of gross investment, any propor-
tional fall in gross investment appears as a substantially greater proportional
fall in net investment. Second, since the difference between gross investment
and net investment is depreciation, the rapid fall in the net investment ratio
reflects a corresponding rise in the ratio of depreciation to GNP.
1. Decomposing the Net Investment Decline
The decline in net investment can be decomposed more precisely into
the fall in gross investment and the rise in depreciation. Let IN/X be the
ratio of net investment to GNP and let iG/X and D/X be the corresponding ratios
for gross investment and depreciation. The gross and net investment ratios for
fixed nonresidential capital are shown in colums 2 and LofTable 1; the




impliesa first approximation for the rates of change
(2) d(IN/X)=a(IG/x) d(D/X)
INIX IN D/X 11'TTABLE 2
THE RELATION BETWEEN GROSS ANDSETNONRESIDENTIAL
AND THE NONRESIDENTIAL CAPITAL STOCK, 19148—1979


















i948 0.060 0.0860.111 0.0614 0.6910.293 0.)-403 0.1421
19149 0.063 0.0810.120 0.063 0.1260.312 0.1413 0.1430
1950 0.062 0.0880.121 0.062 0.7010.308 0.393 0.1439
1951 0.061 0.0890.123 0.062 0.6790.303 0.376 0.14146
1952 0.062 0.0900.127 0.061 0.6810.306 0.375 0.14149
1953 0.062 0.0910.128 0.060 0.68140.309 0.375 0.1452
19514 0.066 0.0920.132 0.060 o.i6 0.321 0.395 0.14)t9
1955 0.0614 0.0920.133 0.059 0.1000.313 0.387' 0.14147
1956 0.066 0.0920.135 0.058 0.7150.317 0.399 0.14143
1957 0.067 0.0920.135 0.057 0.7320.322 0.1410 0.14140
1958 0.069 0.0920.138 0.057 0.7520.325 0.1427 0.1432
1959 0.067 0.0920.138 0.057 0.7290.312 0.1418 0.1427
1960 0.067 0.0910.138 0.056 0.7370.312 0.1425 0.1123
1961 0.067 0.0910.139 0.056 0.7380.307 0.43l 0.1417
1962 0.065 0.0900.139 0.055 0.7220.298 0.14214 0.413
1963 0.06)1 0.0890.138 0.055 0.7190.296 O.423 0.1412
196)4 0.063 0.0890.136 0.055 0.7130.295 O.1t18 0.14114
1965 0.062 0.087 0.13)4 0.0514 0.7130.298 0.1415 0.1418
1966 0.062 0.087 0.131 0.053 0.7180.305 0.1413 0.1425
1967 0.0614 0.087 0.131 0.053 0.7370.317 0.1420 0.1430
1968 0.065 0.087 0.132 0.053 0.71410.322 0.1419 0.14314
1969 0.067 0.088 0.132 0.053 0.7590.333 0.1426 0.1439
1970 0.070 0.088 0.1314 0.053 0.7920.350 0.14142 0.14142
1971 0.071 0.089 0.135 0.053 0.7920.350 0.14141 0.14142
1972 0.071 0.091 0.137 0.0514 0.779 0.3147 0.1431 0.14146
1973 0.070 0.0900.136 0.053 0.77140.352 0.1422 0.14514
19714 0.074 0.0910.136 0.053 0.8110.375 0.1436 0.1462
1975 0.078 0.0930.139 0.053 0.8380.389 0.14148 0.1465
1976 0.077 0.0950.141 0.0514 0.8130.381 0.1432 0.1469
1977 0.076 0.096 0.1142 0.0514 0.79140.379 0.1416 0.1477
1978 0.075 0.096 0.1140 0.0514 0.7860.381 0.405 0.1485
1979 0.077 0.0970.1)-ti 0.055 0.7920.389 0.1403 0.1491—6—
In the last half of the 1960's, 1G/X averaged o.io6, iN/X averaged 0.02, and
therefore D/X averaged o.o61. The 1G/X ratio declined over the next decade to
0.103 in the last half of the 1910's, a fall of 2.8 percent. The Dlx ratio rose
during this interval by 20 percent to 0.077. Substituting these values into the
first term of equation (2) implies that the decline in gross investment contri-
buted —0.028 (0.106/0.0I2) —0.011; i.e. ,ifthe depreciation—to—GNP ratio had
remained constant, the decline in gross investment would have caused net invest-
ment to fall by 7.1 percent. Similarly, substituting the depreciation values
into the second term of equation (2) implies that the increase in depreciation
contributed —0.20 (0.06/.02) =—0.305to the decline in net investment.
Together these two terms imply a net investment fall of —0.376, slightly less
than the observed fall of —0.381; the difference reflects the first—order
approximation nature of equation (2) as well as rounding errors in the original
terms. The values of —0.071 and —0.305 imply that the fall in gross investment
accounts for about 19 percent of the fall in net investment while the rise in
the depreciation—to—GNP ratio accounts for about 81 percent of the fall.
Adjusting the two components proportionately so that they sum to the actual
change of —0.381 implies values of —0.072 and —0.309.
The rise in the depreciation—GNP ratio can itself be usefully decom-
posed into the change in the depreciation rate (i.e., the ratio of depreciation
to thenet capital stock, D/K) and the change in the capital—GNP ratio (K/x).
Table 2provides annual data disaggregated into equipment and structures on the
depreciationrate (colums2 through4)andon the net capital stock as a percent
of GNP (columns 5 through 7). Theidentity
(3)__p_=_.p_.__!c__
X K X—7—
implies the first order approximation in rates of change
(14) d(D/X) d(D/K) d(K/X)
D/X=D/K+K/X
In the second half of the 1960's, the depreciation rate for all fixed nonresi-
dential capital averaged 8.7 percent. This rose to 9.5 percent by the second
half of the 1970's. This implies d(D/K)/(D/K)0.O92.Over the same period,
the ratio of capital to GNP rose from 0.1314 to O.805.- This 9.7 percent rise in
the capital—GNP ratio thus contributed d(K/X)/(K/X)=O.097 to the rise in the
depreciation—GNI ratio. Thken together, the two terms account for a rise of
18.9 percent in the depreciation—GNP ratio.2 Since the rise in the
depreciation—GNP ratio contributed —0.309 to the decline in the ratio of net
investment to GNP, the rise in the depreciation rate (D/K) contributed
(O.092/o.189)(—O.309) =—0.150to the decline in the net investment ratio while
the rise in the capital—GNP ratio contributed (0.091/0.189) (—0.309)—0.159 to
the net investment decline. Thus the rise in the depreciation rate and the rise
in the capital—GNPratio contributed about equally to the higher ratio of depre-
ciation toGNP.
The rise in the depreciation rate can itself be traced to the changing
mix of equipment and structures as well as to the faster depreciation rate for
equipment. Since equipment depreciates more rapidly than structures, a shift in
the composition of the capital stock from structures to equipment increases the
overall rate of depreciation. The relative importance of the changingcomposition
1-The ratio of net capital to GNP peaked at 0.838 in1975 and then began to
decline. The rise in K/X reflects the investment boom of the middle and late
1960's and the relatively low level of depreciation in thoseyears.
2This falls short of the 20 percent rise in D/X because ofrounding errors and
the first—order nature of equation 14.—8—
and changing depreciation rates can becalculated from the identity:
—
(1-e)
where De/E and D5/S are the depreciation rates of equipment and structures, and
eis the fraction of the net capital stock that is equipment. Column 8of Table
2shows annual values of e.Equation 5impliesthat the proportional rise in
D/K can be calculated as:
De D5
(8) d(D/K)=ed(De/E) +(l—e)d(D5/S) + de.
D/K S/K S/K D/K
Substitutingthe levels of the second half of the1960's and the changes between
themand the levels of the second half of the 1970's implies
(fl d(D/K)=0.429(0.009) +0.571(o.ooi) +0.079(0.0)48)
D/K .087 .087 .087
=O.04)4+0.007+0.0)4)4.
Thus,the change in the rate of equipment depreciation raised the overall
depreciation rate by O.O4)4 and thus accounts for nearly half of its rise. By
contrast, the depreciation rate for structures was largely unchanged while the
increasein the relative importance of equipment in the capital stock also
raised the total depreciation rate by 0.0)4)4.The linear decomposition is of
courseonly approximate; the three terms sum to 0.095 while the actual propor-
tional increase in the depreciation rate was 0.092.
Since the increase in the depreciation rate caused net investment to
decline by 15.0 percent, the rise in the rate of equipment depreciation contri-
buted (0.0)4)4/0.095) (0.150) =0.0695of the 0.150. The small rise in the rate of
depreciation of structures added an additional 0.011 while the changing com-
position of the capital stock added 0.0695.—9—
Table3 brings together all of the pieces of the overall decomposition
of the decline in net investment into its several components. These figures
indicate that the increased rate of depreciation and the higher capital—GNP
ratioeach accounted for about ItO percent.
2. Caveats and Implications
The depreciation rates for equipment and structures are calculated by
the Department of Commerce on the basis of very detailed data on the distribu-
tion of gross investment in each year among different types of equipment and
structures. For each type of asset, the Commerce Department uses straight line
depreciation at a rate implied by 85 percent of the Bulletin F life for that
type of asset. Unlike the procedure used for calculating depreciation for tax
purposes, these depreciation calculations are adjusted for increases in the
general price level for investment goods.
Although this procedure is supposed to measure economic depreciation,
it may well be too conservative. First, the straight line depreciation schedule
probably understates the rate of fall of the value (or remaining productive
capacity) of capital assets. Even if the output of an investment good declines
linearly, the resulting value of the asset woulddecline more rapidly.1 Second,
the use of 85percentof Bulletin F lives probably overstates the useful lives
formany types of equipment and may understate overall depreciation. Finally,
i-In particular, a linear decline in output implies a sum—of—the—
years—output decline in the value of the asset.—10—
TABLE3




Decline in Patio of Gross Investment to GNP —0.072 18.9
Increase in Ratio of Depreciation to GNP —0.309 81.1
Increase in Ratio of Capital to GNP —0.159 41.7
Increasein Depreciation Rate -0.150 39.
Increased Equipment Depreciation Pate —0.0695 18.3
Increased Structure Depreciation Pate —0.0110 2.9
Increased EquipmentShare in Capital Stock —0.0695 18.3
Source:Calculationsdescribed in text.
Note: Components may not add exactly due to rounding error.—11—
and perhaps most important for the second half of the 1910's, the jumpinenergy
costs and other petroleum—related prices undoubtedly made many pieces of equip-
ment economically obsolete sooner than they otherwise would have been. The con-
ventional depreciation rates therefore probably understate the amount of depre-
ciation in the late 1910's. Increasing the assumed rate of depreciation to
reflect these three biases in the current procedure would of course reduce the
impliedrate of net investment and, because of the energy price change, would
increasethe relative decline in net investmentbetween the late 1960' s andthe
late 1970's. The increased rate of equipment depreciation would in turn account
for a larger fraction of the greater relative decline in net investment.
The implication for future capital accumulation of the contrast be-
tweenthe sharp decline in net investment andthe much milder decline in gross
investment depends on the character of the firms' investment decision process.
If firms make investment plans directly in terms of gross investment (e.g.,
because gross investment is governed by the available cash flow), the sub stan—
tial slowdown in netinvestment will partlyreverse itself over time as the
ratioof the capital stock to GNP falls and thereby reduces the ratio of depre-
ciation to GNP. But even in this case, net investment will nevertheless con-
tinue to be low relative to GNP if firms continue to devote a high share of
gross investment to equipment.
However, the assumption that firms decide directly on the level of
gross investment is less likely than the view that the rate of gross investment
is a consequence of decisions made in terms of the desired capital stock and of
the attractiveness of particular new investment opportunities. According to
this view, a decline in the desired growth of the capital stock reduces net—12—
investment directly; the change in gross investment then follows from this
change in net investment in a way that depends on the existing capital stock and
the depreciation rate. If this "net investment" interpretation is correct, the
fall in the net investment rate is not just an unfortunate coincidence but the
result of explicit decisions by firms to reduce the growth rate of the capital
stock. Ej-idence presented elsewhere (Feldstein, 1980) suggests that the
reduced real return on investment and the high real cost of capital have in fact
reduced the incentive to invest and caused the recent decline in net investment.—13—
Appendix
Sources of Data
Table 1, Columns 1 and 2
Gross national product, gross investment and the components thereof are
presented in Table 1.2 of the National Income and Product Accounts.The
data used in the paper incorporate the benchmark revisions released in late
1980 and early 1981. rta courtesy of tta Resources, Inc.
Table 1, Columns 3 through 6
Net investment figures are derived from the corresponding gross investment
figures by subtracting depreciation. The depreciation amounts are
Department of Commerce estimates of economic depreciation based on85 per-
cent of Bulletin F lives and straight line depreciation. These depre-
ciation amounts as well as the net and gross investment figures are pre-
sented in Table 5.3 of the National Income and Product Accounts. Revised
data were kindly provided by John C. Hinriebs of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, United States Department of Commerce.
Table 1, Column 1
Thenet capital stock is the Department of Commerce estimate of the net
stock of nonresidential fixed capital that is consistent (exceptfor
severalminor conceptual differences)with the net investment figures in
column4.Thesecapital stock data are presented in Musgrave (1976)
and subsequent issuesof the Survey of Current Business. Revised data were
kindlyprovided by John C. Musgrave of the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
United States Department of Commerce.—l4—
Table 2, Column 1
Depreciation of nonresidential fixed capital is the same data used to
derive column 1 of Table 1.
Table 2, Columns 2 throu±
The disaggregated depreciation figures are the same as those used to derive
columns 5and6ofTable 1. The corresponding net capital stocks are also
theDepartment of Commerce estimates provided by Musgrave and used for
Table 1, column7.
Table2, Columns 5 through 8
These ratios use the capital stock and GNP data already described.
Note: All data used are in 1912 dollars.—15--
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